Strategic Acquisition of Navy Unmanned Systems: Analysis and Options by Dew, Nicholas
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2012-07-12
Strategic Acquisition of Navy Unmanned




Acquisition Research Program 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
  
  
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited. 
 










Strategic Acquisition of Navy Unmanned Systems:     
Analysis and Options 
12 July 2012 
by 
Dr. Nicholas Dew, Associate Professor 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
  
Acquisition Research Program 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY 
















The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Research 
Program of the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
To request defense acquisition research, to become a research sponsor, or to print 
additional copies of reports, please contact any of the staff listed on the Acquisition 
Research Program website (www.acquisitionresearch.net). 
  
 
Acquisition Research Program 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY  - i - 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Abstract 
The U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) have many 
emerging robotics needs and potentialities. However, although the U.S. is strong in 
defense robotics—in particular in Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) -- recent reports 
have identified fundamental weaknesses in the broader U.S. robotics innovation 
system in which defense robotics is embedded. Since the potential scale of 
commercial robotics is far greater than military robotics over the long run, the U.S. 
needs to develop a stronger national robotics innovation system to support the long-
term development of defense robotics and help make the nation more secure. 
Traditionally, the policy response to such needs has involved stimulating the supply 
side. This report identifies robust local U.S. demand for robotics as a critical element 
in developing a thriving U.S. robotics innovation system. Therefore, while some DoD 
acquisition strategies attend to industry development via supply-side elements (such 
as research and development support for major suppliers, Small Business 
Innovation Research initiatives, etc.), I suggest that these initiatives must be 
complemented with a set of pro–demand-side acquisition strategies. This report 
outlines the rationale for including a demand-side approach in DoD robotics 
acquisition policy, a set of appropriate strategies, and a framework for 
implementation.  
Keywords: DoD emerging robotics needs, defense robotics, pro-demand 
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I. Introduction 
National Security is founded on a Robust Innovation System … A Robust 
Innovation System will help make the Nation Militarily and Economically 
Secure. Robust Defense Spending alone will not make the Nation more 
Innovative, thus, ultimately Less Secure. (Charles Wessner, Director of 
Technology and Innovation, National Research Council, 2004, slide 58). 
The U.S. Navy (USN) and Department of Defense (DoD) has many emerging 
robotics needs (“FY2009–2034 Unmanned Systems,” 2009; “The Navy UUV Master 
Plan,” 2004; Button, Kamp, Curtin, & Dryden, 2009). This paper examines questions 
that lie at the interface between the DoD’s robotics requirements and initiatives and 
the acquisition policies that enable and sustain them. My focus is on how the DoD 
might use strategic acquisition to optimally harness technical development in the 
naval robotics space.  In this report I will provide a framework that supports future 
acquisition policies in DoD robotics. The report starts with the premise that a broader 
range of acquisition policies might be employed strategically by the DoD to get more 
of what it needs out of the robotics industry. While there is ample research on public 
policy tools available, in general, to nurture industries and plenty of research on the 
impact of defense spending, in general (including specifically on defense research 
and development R&D spending), there is much less work on how particular 
acquisition tactics can be directly employed by the DoD  to nurture industry 
segments that are important to it (Birkler et al., 2003). In addition, while supply-side 
support via R&D spending has been studied in the past, the role of demand-side 
policies (and therefore the acquisition policy tools) has been largely overlooked. Yet 
demand is a key driver of innovation in industries (Edler & Georghiou, 2007) and—in 
my view—has significant potential to impact how the nascent and rapidly developing 
defense robotics industry might evolve in the future. This is an important issue: by 
acting strategically now, our acquisition policies might be geared to enable demand-
side factors that may help the defense robotics industry to develop along paths that 
are advantageous to the DoD in the future. 
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Of course, robotics is a classic “dual-use” technology, meaning that its 
fundamental facets are shared between military and civilian/commercial uses.  This 
report takes as its context the Computing Community Consortium (CCC) 2009 
robotics report, a recent synopsis of the U.S. national robotics industry that identified 
significant weaknesses in the robotics  sector (CCC, 2009).  That report notes that 
“Led by Japan, Korea, and the European Union, the rest of the world has recognized 
the irrefutable need to advance robotics technology and have made research 
investment commitments totaling over $1 billion; the U.S. investment in robotics 
technology, outside unmanned systems for defense purposes, remains practically 
non-existing” (CCC, 2009).  Recognizing the nation’s shortfalls, President Obama 
announced a $70 million kick-start investment in robotics R&D on June 24, 2011, 
called the National Robotics Initiative (NRI).  Since the one bright spot and area of 
strength for U.S. robotics has been military robotics—in particular, unmanned aerial 
systems (UAS)—one may wonder why this matters.  The fact is that Department of 
Defense (DoD) robotics spend alone is not enough to fuel a flourishing national 
robotics industry over the longer term because it is posed to be rapidly overtaken by 
commercial spending on robotics on a global scale. Yet research on national 
prosperity has identified that leadership in particular technologies has been a crucial 
element contributing to national well-being in the past.  Such leadership has both 
direct and indirect effects: direct when it involves leadership in industry sectors such 
as aerospace that are intimately connected with developing and fielding military 
capabilities; and indirect because national wealth is a significant predictor of military 
prowess in general.  According to recent work summarized by Cimoli, Dosi, and 
Stiglitiz (2009), 
In fact in each epoch there appear to be technologies whose domain of 
application are so wide and their role so crucial that the pattern of technical 
change of each country depends to a large extent on the technical capabilities 
in mastering production/imitation/innovation in such crucial knowledge areas 
(e.g., in the past, mechanical engineering, electricity and electrical devices, 
and nowadays also information technologies) … Thus, these core 
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In the future, robotics is likely to be one of the core technologies fuelling 
economic prosperity, and therefore a key industry in which the U.S., needs to be a 
major participant (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2012; CCC, 2009; Markoff, 2012). 
A. Commercial R&D Spend Dwarfs Pentagon Spend 
An important contextual element for understanding why demand-side 
strategies make sense for the DoD is the wider pattern of research and development 
(R&D) spend globally. It is well known that after peaking in the 1950s, the 
Pentagon’s share of global R&D spend has steadily decreased (see Figure 1) to the 
point where today, the Pentagon’s R&D spend is dwarfed by commercial R&D spend 
that occurs on a global basis. In a provocative presentation, Wessner (2004) argued 
that the Pentagon’s R&D spending is one of the central innovation myths that exist 
about the U.S. defense establishment and that the Pentagon has not nearly the clout 
it had in the 1950s and 1960s to influence the direction of R&D activities (contra 
Hooks, 1990). In a similar vein of argument, Alic, Branscomb, Brooks, Carter, and 
Epstein  (1992) criticized another Pentagon myth, what they call the “spin-off” model 
of technology transfer from the military to the commercial sector, which—with a few 
notable exceptions mainly funded by DARPA (GPS, the Internet)—has been 
swamped by the amount of “spin-in” from the commercial sector to defense. 
Summarizing the  issues highlighted in this paragraph, the 2011 UK Ministry of 
Defense Joint Doctrine Note (MOD JDN) on UAS concludes that 
The changes in world economies over the last 2 decades mean that the 
military sector is now dwarfed by the economic size and power of the 
commercial sector. Except perhaps for space, new developments in military 
systems are therefore likely to come from specialized development of 
commercial systems rather than vice versa. It is to the commercial sector that 
we must look for the delivery of future disruptive technology. 
To this data must be added several factors that further mitigate in favor of 
spin-in as the predominant basis for future military R&D, rather than spin-out.  First, 
military robotics needs are too specific to drive R&D in the robotics industry as a 
whole; instead, military robotics needs and their requisite R&D support are just one 
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of many segments of the broader robotics industry.  Second, robotics differs from 
some past technologies in which Pentagon R&D played a prominent role in 
technology evolution because it has not grown up with the kind of extreme 
dependence on military R&D that has characterized sectors such as aircraft 
development.  Instead, the cutting-edge robotics research is more dispersed globally 
and less dependent on military orders, with many of its key developments going on 
in commercial sectors such as medical robotics. Third, one can argue that in 
robotics, all of the major technological pieces are now basically in place and what 
exceptions there are—for example, needs for lightweight, long-life power sources in 
many applications—are not robotic-specific technologies.  Once again, this means 
that the technology development issues are dispersed across other industrial sectors 
and are not specific to the military. 
All of the preceding factors suggest in favor of a view of robotics industry 
development that over the long run is dominated by the commercial sector rather 
than military R&D support or requirements. Robotics is a classic dual-use technology 
in which it is likely that military robotics development will be paced and driven by 
developments in the commercial sector owing to growth in the market size of that 
sector relative to the military robotics market.  This suggests that the future of 
military robotics lies in spin-in of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) technologies 
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Figure 1. U.S. Defense Share of Organization of Economic Development (OECD) R&D 
10 1960–1990  
(Alic et al., 1992) 
B. Misconceptions about the Relative Efficacy of Policy 
Tools: R&D vs. Demand 
As well as the influence of these important trends in R&D spend (as 
highlighted in Figure 1) on the robotics industry, one might add that past analyses of 
major technology trends tend to perpetuate an important misconception about how 
innovation occurs and how innovation is turned into military value (Bhide, 2006). The 
misconception is that leadership in R&D is the same as leadership in innovation—in 
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particular that upstream “R” (research) is the primary mechanism underpinning the 
emergence of innovative new technologies with genuine military utility.  This 
misconception is part of a system of very sticky beliefs about R&D that have been 
criticized as “techno-fetishism” (Ostry & Nelson, 1995). Within the R&D world 
generally, such techno-fetishism has resulted in a gross over-estimation of the 
relative value of R (research) as compared to D (development), i.e. of upstream 
research compared to downstream development.  Economic studies have 
contributed to the perpetuation of this misconception by using patent counts as their 
primary measure of innovation, which, by representing innovation in terms of 
patents, clearly helps perpetuate the myth that innovation is the prodigal son of 
upstream research spending, despite the fact that patent counts have been roundly 
criticized as a measure of innovation in a wide range of research. 
In fact, R&D subsidies either in the form of incentives (tax breaks) or direct 
grants are only one of four major categories of public policy that effect 
innovativeness (Geroski, 1990), with the other incentives being regulations (e.g., 
laws and standards), infrastructure investments (e.g., in the educational system), 
and public acquisition. Of these incentives, direct public acquisition (e.g., demand) 
appears to be by far the most potent tool of public policy and one that has been 
wielded particularly effectively in the defense business but also in other areas such 
as energy innovation.  Latent or emergent demand that goes beyond the capabilities 
of current technology is a significant factor stimulating producers to invest in 
innovation. In fact, changing user needs are frequently cited as one of the top factors 
in creating incentives for innovation, across a wide range of industries (BDL, 2003). 
Empirical evidence bears out this claim. For example, in one well-known study that 
examined the genesis of 50 industrial clusters, public procurement was a “very big” 
or “major” factor in 50% of these developments. By comparison, R&D subsidies 
made a very big or major impact on only four clusters out of 50 (a mere 8%; 
Rothwell & Zegveld, 1981). Combined with other evidence, this led Geroski (1990) to 
conclude that “[P]rocurement policy is, in general, a far more efficient instrument to 
  
 
Acquisition Research Program 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY  - 7 - 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
use in stimulating innovation than any of a wide range of frequently used R&D 
subsides” (p. 183). 
Techno-fetishists also underestimate the extent to which the D (development) 
in R&D may better explain technological leadership and why this is so. Yet keen 
observers of military history, such as Max Boot in his 2008 study of several centuries 
of military technological change, seem to be well aware of the real drivers of military 
innovation.  Boot (2008) concluded as follows: 
The way to gain a military advantage, therefore, is not necessarily to be the 
first to produce a new tool or weapon. It is to figure out better than anyone 
else how to utilize a widely available tool or weapon. 
This downstream development of innovation—figuring out better than anyone 
else how to utilize new technology—has several important characteristics that are 
worth highlighting. First among these is that innovation occurs in concert with users, 
for innovation is the process of customizing technology into something of genuine 
utility for users. As highlighted by Rosenberg (1976) and since emphasized in so 
many studies of innovation, customizing new technology into innovations of genuine 
utility involves extensive interaction between technology developers and technology 
users, with the result that innovation tends to be a gradual and complex process of 
problem solving that uses significant resources. The phenomenon described by 
Rosenberg is highlighted by the Pentagon’s own R&D budget (see Figure 2), with its 
preponderance of D spending. 
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Figure 2. Character of Defense and Nondefense R&D FY2005 Budget, Budget 
Authority in Billions 
(Wessner, 2004, slide 8) 
A second important characteristic of downstream innovation is that it 
generally involves recombinations of extant technologies rather than the 
incorporation of de novo technology (Schumpeter, 1976). Upon investigation, it is 
customary to find that nearly every technology called new and radical has a much 
longer history than realized upon first inspection and that the dominant processes in 
innovation are the application of technologies to solve (new) problems usually by 
some kind of combination with other pre-existing technologies.  Again, the emphasis 
belongs on the downstream work of adapting technologies to solve user problems or 
serve some need/desire of value.  
A third important factor in downstream innovation is the relative locational 
“stickiness” of the process compared to upstream invention (von Hippel, 1994). 
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Because the customization process depends heavily on long, drawn-out processes 
of developer-user interaction, downstream innovation is locationally constrained in 
ways that patents (the prototypical manifestation of upstream innovation) are not. 
Therefore, downstream innovation is less mobile than upstream innovation. In 
military terms, this means that downstream D is less threatened by the imitative 
designs of rival countries than upstream R.  This becomes all the more important 
when one considers which type of innovation—upstream R or downstream D—
creates the most value. 
Economists frame the issue of value capture from innovation as one of who 
captures the surplus, or profits, from new technologies.  On the one hand, a 
consumer surplus is available from utilizing a new technology; on the other hand, 
there is the surplus captured by the inventors of new technologies. Several 
economic studies have examined this issue, and all concluded that the vast bulk of 
value from innovation is captured by users, not producers of innovation.  In other 
words, the majority of the value from innovating is captured downstream, not 
upstream. In Nordhaus’ 2004 study, which measures the division of this surplus, 
Nordhaus concluded that 
[O]nly a miniscule fraction of the social returns from technological advances 
over the 1948-2001 period was captured by producers, indicating that most of 
the benefits of technological change are passed on to consumers rather than 
captured by producers. 
In Nordhaus’ study, miniscule was 4%. In other words, per Max Boot 
(2008),leadership in applying a new tool (or weapon)—which flows from downstream 
D—is the key to capturing value from innovations and is not at all the same thing as 
being the first to invent and possess a new technology (upstream R), which by 
comparison typically yields much less return.  
The upshot of all of this is that not only is military R&D not the place to look 
for robotics innovation going forward but neither is R&D the place to look for 
innovation more generally. Instead, the focus needs to shift to demand as the factor 
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on which the majority of robotics innovation will depend. This means that there is an 
important mismatch between mindshare occupied by R&D and mindshare occupied 
by demand as tools of innovation policy (Edler & Georghiou, 2007). The Pentagon’s 
actual R&D budget reflects a lot more D than R, as it should.  But the way we 
conceptualize and talk about the relative importance of R&D does not reflect either 
the Pentagon’s actual behavior or what we know more generally about the 
importance of downstream demand in the innovation process. A necessary first step 
in getting our approach to policy-making right is to recognize this mismatch between 
policy talk and reality and build our strategies for influencing industry development 
around the reality of downstream demand as the vehicle of industry development, 
rather than the current gross overemphasis on upstream research.  Ultimately, a 
crucial key to having a U.S. military robotics capability par excellence is that the U.S. 
military robotics business dwells in a robust national robotics industry, which will only 
exist if it is powered by domestic demand for robotics systems, because most of the 
value capture from innovations occurs via downstream adaptation of innovations to 
meet specific local demand. This is the major reason that defense acquisition 
strategy has an important role in the overall policy mix for the U.S. robotics 
innovation system—because demand, embodied in direct acquisition, is arguably by 
far the most important tool for driving innovation (Geroski, 1990; summarized in 
Figure 3).    
 
Figure 3. Shifting Mindsets About the Drivers of Innovation 
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C. The DoD Needs a Demand-Side Strategy for Robotics 
From the proceeding arguments, we can see that an R&D strategy alone is 
insufficient to support a dynamic U.S. robotics innovation system over the long run, 
per the Obama kick-start.  What has to be realized is that, ultimately, R&D dollars 
are paid for out of the pockets of users, that is, on the basis of (future) demand for 
the products and services that the R&D prospectively will make available.  Robust 
domestic demand for robotics therefore provides the shared resources to pay for 
R&D that needs to be undertaken on the supply side. What the DoD needs is a large 
number of user partners sharing its R&D load, thus making its R&D dollars stretch 
much further via scale economies and synergistic R&D. Because the largest part of 
this spend is actually D, and this happens further downstream in connection with 
user needs, innovation won’t happen unless user communities are significantly 
involved, which requires them to see the promise and practical application of 
robotics technologies to business problems that they care about solving. This makes 
user demand the bottleneck in robotics industry development, not supply.  If the DoD 
wants to influence the long-run trajectory of the U.S. robotics innovation system (for 
its own gain), its acquisition strategy should therefore make use of demand-side 
policy tools. What is needed is the facilitation of a demand environment that is 
innovation friendly. To achieve this innovation friendliness, one of the primary tools 
that the DoD has available is acquisition strategy.  
The overall goal of this aspect of acquisition strategy can be summarized 
simply: helping the U.S. to maintain/become the world’s lead market in air, marine, 
and utility robotics by accelerating the diffusion of these technologies in the U.S. 
Any goals that the DoD adopts must be implemented in a complex, policy 
environment with several other federal actors (e.g., FBI, CIA, Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), the Coastguard) that have an active interest in 
developing the robotics industry, plus many other actors (e.g., state and local law 
enforcement, commercial industries such as oil and agriculture, industry 
associations such as the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems [AUVSI]) that 
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together constitute a complex and fragmented system that collectively provides a 
“policy mix” for the robotics industry (Flanagan, Uyarra, & Laranja, 2011).  The 
argument developed in this paper is that it is important to focus on what is missing 
from the policy mix influencing the development of the robotics industry at present. 
In general, the demand-side of the innovation policy mix has been sorely neglected 
in the recent past, both in policy circles and in the research domain (Geroski, 1990).  
In an effort to revive it, recent research by Edler and Georghiou (2007) defined 
demand-side policy tools as follows: 
[D]emand-based innovation policies are defined as the set of public measures 
to articulate, increase demand for innovations and/or improve conditions for 
the uptake of innovations in order to spur innovation and their diffusion into 
the marketplace. (p. 952)  
Part of my argument is that the DoD has limited resources and is subject to 
various administrative constraints that curtail its ability to do all that might be 
desirable to influence the directions of the robotics industry in the near and longer 
term.  Recognizing this makes it all the more important for the DoD to pursue some 
specific targets via its acquisition strategy, rather than going after many targets at 
once.  As we will see when we study the robotics industry (or innovation system, as I  
will call it) in more detail, it therefore makes a great deal of sense for the DoD 
entities to pursue key bottlenecks in robotics industry development, vice targeting 
areas that are not constraining the industry’s progress. The conclusion that the DoD 
should focus its efforts on supporting demand for commercial marine and aviation 
robotics in the U.S. will initially seem like a strange strategy since external outreach 
by the DoD is almost always via supporting R&D on the supply-side. But the supply-
side is not the bottleneck in robotics development; what is weak in the U.S. is the 
demand-side. Therefore, there is a role for a demand-side strategy by the DoD in 
order to help push the development of the U.S. military robotics industry. The rest of 
this report proceeds as follows.  
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The next section (Section 2) of the paper explains the logic for highlighting 
demand-side aspects of the robotics industry as part of a more systematic analysis 
of the global robotics innovation system.  
Section 3 proposes several demand-side policy tools that could be used as 
part of the DoD’s portfolio of R&D activities and acquisition practices.     
Section 4 rounds out the report by suggesting an implementation framework 
for these policy tools that recognizes the unique DoD environment in which 
implementation has to take place and incorporates proposals for evaluating the 
effectiveness of what is done. 
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II. The U.S. National Robotics Innovation 
System 
A. The “Innovation Systems” Framework: A Brief Overview 
There is a long tradition of researching industries both in economics 
(Industrial organization—“IO” studies) and in sociology (population ecology studies).  
To a large extent, these studies focus on that which is easiest to see in industries, 
which is the body of suppliers: the supply-side of an industry.  However, the 
limitations of these approaches have become apparent: they are largely static, 
neglect many of the actors involved in industries, and have a limited ability to explain 
innovativeness (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
2011). Starting in the 1980s, a new stream of thought called the Innovation Systems 
approach emerged (Freeman, 1987), which grew out of the perception that 
traditional industry studies were, in fact, hiding as much as they were illuminating by 
missing or underemphasizing some of the most crucial elements and aspects of 
industries. Some of these studies evolved from studying national systems of 
innovation, where it was very apparent in countries such as Japan (Freeman, 1987) 
that a much wider and more varied system of actors were intimately involved in 
innovative activity (Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993).  Other studies emerged as studies 
of technology systems, set on a global stage unbounded by geographic factors. 
Researchers further outlined a sectoral systems approach and problem-focused 
approaches (Metcalfe & Tether, 2003). As of the present time, the innovation 
systems approach has become the received wisdom in many economic policy-
making circles. (See the 2003 RAND report [Birkler et al.] to the U.S. Congress for a 
useful example and the 2011 OECD report for an overview of national innovation 
systems.) Freeman (1987) provides a reasonable consensus definition of this 
approach: a national system of innovation is “[T]he network of institutions in the 
public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify 
and diffuse new technologies.”   
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Two elements distinguish the innovation systems approach to studying 
industries.  First, the cast of actors included in this approach is considered larger 
and more varied than in traditional industry studies.  Innovation system studies 
highlight all the actors involved in an industry, many of which play subtle roles. 
Examples include the role of 
 government bodies, such as Japan’s MITI, which is explicitly charged 
with industrial policy, or regulatory bodies, such as consumer 
standards authorities, which shape markets; 
 public or private standards bodies, which cover technology 
compatibility issues, and independent quality assessment agencies 
(e.g., in automobiles J. D. Power);   
 industry consortia of various kinds, such as those involving shared 
R&D, supplier groups, or user groups; 
 educational institutions, such as universities, providing fundamental 
and applied research as well as training for industry-specific 
occupations; 
 public research institutes; 
 producers of products and services; 
 secondary suppliers and intermediaries, such as service firms, sales 
and marketing channels, and contractors that provide services to the 
system; and 
 users. 
Together with emphasizing the large number and variety of actors populating 
an innovation system (the components of the system), innovation system research 
emphasizes a second important factor, which is the nature of the linkages between 
the components of the system. What is important is the web of activities connecting 
players in the system. In particular, researchers draw attention to the interactive 
nature of innovation systems—one where interaction between users and producers 
increases the performance of products and services produced in the system by 
compound user-producer learning over time. Much of this performance improvement 
happens via patterns of networked one-to-one user-producer interactions, 
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particularly when technically competent users, often with very specific demands, 
interact with technically competent suppliers with specific skills in designing products 
and services. These interactions generate iterative cycles of learning and mutual 
adaptation that increase the competence and capability of the overall system.   
Third, I should also mention that the conception of innovation systems takes 
for granted that they are dynamic, that is, evolving over time. New players arrive and 
are incorporated into the system, bringing with them new resources of knowledge for 
problem solving.  At the same time, defunct players may drop out of the system and 
their knowledge may be discarded (Metcalfe & Tether, 2003). 
Yet despite the inclusion of demand in innovation systems research in theory, 
there is still a lack of demand-side orientation in innovation policy as it is practiced.  
Why? Quite probably because demand is the least visible, most intangible aspect of 
innovation systems.  In Figure 4 below we incorporate demand side players into our 
illustration of the U.S. robotics innovation system.  As shown by Porter’s The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990), domestic demand conditions are a crucial 
factor in the performance of innovation systems.  It is to this issue that I turn next.
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B. The Porter “Diamond” Framework 
Among research on innovation systems, Porter’s (1990) work on national 
competitiveness stands out with regard to its emphasis on demand-side factors.  
Porter’s work is based on a large set of case studies drawn from 10 countries and 
100 internationally competitive industries that was undertaken in the 1980s. Porter’s 
basic premise was that the long-term international competitive success of firms was 
a product of their innovativeness. Porter looked for companies that were globally 
successful in export markets and then traced the national context in which they were 
embedded.  Analysis of the cases revealed that four generic factors working 
together as a system constituted the context for successful exporters. Porter called 
these factors the “Diamond” (see Figure 5): 
 Factor conditions: refer to national factors of production such as skilled 
labor.  
 Related and supporting industries: refer to the presence of 
internationally competitive supplier industries. 
 Domestic rivalry: refers to the national governance of competition and 
the amount of rivalry between firms. 
 Demand conditions: refer to the nature of domestic demand for firms’ 




Acquisition Research Program 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY  - 20 - 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
 
Figure 5. Porter Diamond Model 
One of Porter’s key conclusions was that the location of demand in innovation 
systems remains important and, specifically, that the quality of domestic demand is a 
key factor in driving firms to innovate in a national system (Porter, 1990).  The 
observation and reasoning here is that there are various ways in which national 
innovation systems depend on sophisticated users for a key part of their vitality. 
Examples include: the role of Finnish customers’ demand for sophisticated mobile 
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phones in the rise of Finland’s telecommunications sector (in particular, Nokia); the 
role of sophisticated local demand in the New York, Paris, and Milan fashion 
clusters; and the role of DoD demand for UAS for prosecuting the War on Terror 
(WoT) in the development of a local (mainly Southern Californian) cadre of 
competitive suppliers of these systems. 
While Porter’s claim that “location matters” for demand is well known, the 
explanation for this pattern is less well understood.  The key to the location-
specificity of demand—that is, the claim that the location of demand matters—is that 
the information required for solving problems (e.g., customer needs for 
improvements to a product) must be brought together with the capability to solve the 
problem (e.g., skilled producers with the ability to engender a solution).  In other 
words, the location of the intense interactions between users and producers that is 
required for the process of customizing innovations is driven by the “stickiness” of 
information (von Hippel, 1994). If information could be transferred at little cost, then 
the problem-solving activities that lead to refined innovations could be located 
anywhere.  However, empirical work on the stickiness of information suggests quite 
the opposite: for instance, Teece’s (1977) study of 26 international technology 
transfer projects showed that information transfer costs averaged 19% of the project 
costs, ranging from 2% to 59% depending on the nature of the technology 
transferred.  When information is costly to transfer, problem-solving activity will tend 
to occur where the information is stuck.  There are several reasons why the kind of 
information used in innovation is often sticky: 
1. Much of the relevant information for problem solving is very specific 
and particular. This information is private to users, may be difficult to 
describe, and thus resists being made explicit (and therefore more 
easily transferable) and instead remains implicit or “tacit” in nature.  
2. To generate a solution to a problem may require very large amounts of 
information about the problem to be transferred from users to 
producers, including a lot of information about the exact context in 
which the problem occurs.  For example, problem solving in a 
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3. Information may be sticky because it requires high absorbative 
capacity on the part of the senders and the receivers, that is, the 
producer has to possess or acquire the requisite information and 
knowledge to be able to use the user’s information. 
4. Problem solving is dynamic, that is, the information required is updated 
in iterative cycles of problem-solving activity. 
In the Porter Diamond, the key characteristic of local demand highlighted is its 
sophistication.  Porter (1990) argued that lead users and markets are important for 
prodding producers to improve their product offerings and innovate. Here, the local 
market has a disproportionate effect on firms’ perceptions of what users want more 
generally, and can often serve as “bellweathers” of emerging customer demands, 
thus giving producers an earlier picture of where the market is heading (Porter, 
1990; Edler & Georghiou, 2007). Other local demand conditions that may be 
important include (i) the size of the local market, which may enable producers to 
develop economies of scale; (ii) the diversity of local demand (how fragmented the 
local market is), which may lead producers to develop sophisticated offerings 
responding to a wide variety of market needs; and (iii) how well-formed and well-
articulated local demand is, which may enable producers to have a better “read” on 
the market’s signals (Geroski, 2003).  
C. The Role of “Venturesome” Users in Innovation Systems 
A further crucial characteristic of local demand is the venturesomeness of 
users (Bhide, 2006). By venturesome, I mean the willingness of users to experiment 
with new products and services. For example, the DoD has a long history of 
willingness to be a venturesome user of new technologies, UAS included. However, 
while the venturesomeness of producers (for example, their entrepreneurship) is 
frequently highlighted as a key element of the vitality of innovation systems and 
whole economies, the venturesomeness of users—which is equally important for the 
innovativeness of a system—has been largely ignored.  Yet clearly one needs both 
venturesome producers and venturesome adopters (users) to drive the vibrancy of 
an innovation system. 
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Understanding why user venturesomeness is necessary requires a closer 
look at the nature of adopting innovations. For several reasons, I see that 
considerable risk-taking is required on the part of users seeking to adopt an 
innovation. These reasons can be summarized as follows (Bhide, 2008): 
 One cause of risk is whether the innovation will work as it is supposed 
to, meeting minimal standards, and whether it will work well. Upon 
longer-term use there is the question of whether it will keep working 
well or, as in the case of the Lockheed C5, need very expensive 
unanticipated repairs to its wings. Long-term use might also reveal 
issues relating to human safety (asbestos) that creates unforeseen 
operating expenses or environmental pollution (CFCs) or disposal 
costs (nuclear waste) that were not initially accounted for. Indeed, the 
novelty of innovations implies that incalculable costs are involved in 
their application. Given how problematic it is to predict the performance 
of innovations, it comes as no surprise that innovations "bite back" with 
some regularity, imposing unforeseen private and social costs because 
their consequences prove to be different than those they were 
designed to have. With consumer goods, business-to-business goods, 
and most certainly military goods, there are numerous examples of 
innovations biting back, for example, Agent Orange in Vietnam and 
depleted uranium in Gulf War I. 
 Another cause of risk for users is whether an innovation will attract a 
critical mass of other users. This risk is particularly large for goods that 
exhibit bandwagon effects driven by network externalities or the 
presence of complementary goods that create lock-in effects for 
winners, such as that experienced in computing with Microsoft 
Windows. However, failure to attract a critical mass of users is also 
risky when there are significant economies of scale or learning effects 
for a product, since in the absence of a critical mass, these scale and 
learning effects do not transpire as predicted. One could argue that this 
is the case for marine robotics, where the absence of a critical mass of 
users keeps the USN’s marine robotics very expensive as compared to 
UAS, for example, where scale (and therefore learning effects) are 
more evident (Button et al., 2009).   
 A third cause of risk to users is uncertainty about the value of an 
innovation in relation to its price.  To be frank, this issue is already a 
conspicuous one in the economics of military artifacts because it goes 
without saying that evaluating the worth of many military products and 
services is extremely difficult, and ultimately, these decisions are made 
in the mind’s eye of the most senior commanders in the armed 
Services. What, for example, is an F-22 really worth compared to its 
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price?  What are 188 of them worth compared to what the program 
cost?  Behavioral researchers have argued that “[P]eople don’t have 
clue theorists about the value of things they have never experienced” 
(Bhide, 2008) and that because of the unmeasurable/unquantifiable 
nature of their valuations, they cannot form objective estimates about 
the worthwhile-ness of adopting many innovations. Similarly, if the F22 
is never deployed in competitive combat, we will never know its true 
worth. Instead of valuation, users really on their venturesomeness, that 
is, their willingness to experiment with and try out new stuff. 
 Lastly, the uncertainty about the costs of implementing innovations 
imposes risks and therefore requires venturesomeness on the part of 
users. Owing to several factors such as organizational inertia and 
barriers to innovation (Dew, 2010), innovations often suffer from 
frictional costs in the implementation process. Given that innovations 
frequently don’t perform as planned, deriving utility from them requires 
considerable user problem solving and learning by doing, none of 
which can be accurately costed ahead of time. Indeed, one of the 
overwhelming facts about innovations is just how much time, treasure, 
and talent is expended in the pursuit of implementing them (Denning & 
Dunham, 2010). In the UAS domain, good examples include UAS 
crashes in the history of the U.S. Air Force (USAF; Gertler, 2012), 
which illustrate the non-trivial costs of learning to master this new 
technology.  It also illustrates the irony of deploying UAS on the basis 
of expectations of lower manpower requirements: in fact UAS exhibit 
surprising total cost of ownership challenges owing to their high 
consumption of manpower, to both operate them and to analyze the 
huge amounts of data they collect.   
A good understanding of the need for venturesomeness among users is a 
prerequisite for appreciating what kinds of actions the DoD might take to accelerate 
the diffusion of air, marine, and utility robotics in the U.S.  Based on rational diffusion 
theory, prospective adopters will evaluate the balance of pros and cons from 
adopting an innovation: if the risk of downsides can be reduced, then the payoff to 
adoption improves and I would expect adoption rates to increase (all other things 
being equal). Therefore, if it is in the DoD’s long-term interests to strengthen the 
U.S. robotics innovation system by increasing domestic demand for robotics from all 
sectors of the economy, then figuring out how—at the margin—to reduce the 
necessity for user venturesomeness becomes the cornerstone for such strategies. 
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D. CI and Defense Demand Complementarity 
My argument so far has been that the U.S. needs to develop a stronger 
national robotics innovation system to support the long-run development of defense 
robotics that will help make the nation more secure. My review of innovation systems 
has highlighted the following: first, that the systems perspective is helpful because it 
draws our attention equally to all the diverse actors—and the interactions between 
the actors—in an industry such as robotics, thus helping us not to overlook the core 
role of users and demand in the system; second, that the characteristics of 
demand—in particular, sophisticated domestic users that demand high 
performance—is an important aspect of a vibrant national innovation system; and 
third, that user venturesomeness is prerequisite for the uptake of innovative goods 
offered by producers in the system. Now I turn to a fourth element of demand that is 
relevant for dual-use goods such as robotics, which is the complementary nature of 
commercial and military demand for robotics. 
I start with what the U.S. defense establishment contributes to the nature of 
demand within innovation systems.   
First, the business of defense has performance needs that often go beyond 
the requirements of commercial or consumer systems. This has sometimes been 
referred to as “gold plating” defense equipment, but the need for such elevated 
performance is obvious: first, to possess equipment that performs distinctly better 
than that possessed by nations hostile to the U.S. (arms race logic); second, by 
doing so, to reduce the risks of engaging in combat for U.S. military personnel 
(casualty reduction aims); and third, one might add a deterrent component, which is 
to intimidate hostile entities and thus dissuade them from aggressive acts, by them 
observing the U.S. commitment to equipment that is significantly better than their 
own. While it is hard to estimate the cost of wars avoided, it would seem that a 
degree of gold plating is more than worth it in order to avoid a major conflict. 
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The second way in which defense contributes to demand is by playing the 
role of lead user, engaging in experimentation and in pioneering and piloting new 
technologies. In this regard, the DoD has a long history of being a venturesome user 
of new technology, par excellence. While the list of pioneered technologies is a very 
long one, Hooks’ (1990) case study of the genesis of the microelectronics industry 
provided a particularly good example of the DoD as a lead user that prodded and 
pushed producers to improve their product offerings (Porter, 1990). The recent wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan provide numerous similar examples. 
Third, the DoD contributes to the nature of demand via its large-scale 
Programs of Record (PORs) that provide a source of relatively stable, long-term 
demand commitments for innovative goods. These often stretch over many years, as 
with Lockheed C-130 production (at over 50 years, the longest continuous 
production of a military aircraft) or the prospective multi-decade commitment to the 
highly innovative F-35. 
Commercial businesses contribute different characteristics to the nature of 
demand within innovation systems than those contributed by the DoD.  However, in 
many ways, these elements are complementary to what the DoD brings to the table. 
First, commercial businesses have a cost focus that overrides other 
requirements. If commercial firms cannot make money using an innovation, then 
they have no reason to pursue it.  As I have already discussed, while there is a 
distinct need for firms to be venturesome because of the difficulties in estimating the 
value of innovations and their costs of implementation, the cost focus of firms, at 
minimum, puts significant pressure on producers to attend to costs in a material way 
if they want to win business with customers. 
Second, the potential size of most commercial markets ultimately dwarfs the 
size of defense markets, which means that commercial demand holds the promise of 
larger economies of scale and bigger learning effects in production that defense 
markets do not.  
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Third, commercial markets have a broader variety of needs than in military 
markets, simply because there are many more users (a function of scale, again). 
This often creates technology niches that support the survival of a broader variety of 
producers in an industry than many military markets exhibit (Birkler et al., 2003). 
Moreover, whereas the DoD sometimes commits to long production runs of 
innovative technologies to meet demand, commercial markets (and, even more so, 
consumer markets) tend to operate on shorter timescales. Commercial and 
consumer markets therefore exhibit market dynamics that demand ongoing 
processes of incessant innovation from the supply base as producers are forced to 
compete to adapt their designs with the latest technology to meet emerging user 
needs.   
Fourth, and finally, the incentive structure of commercial demand also tends 
to support the inclusion of disruptive innovation more speedily than military demand 
does (Christensen, 1997). Again, the reason for this may have to do with demand 
variety in the commercial space. By its nature, disruptive innovation tends to creep in 
at the margins of markets, starting with users and uses that are outside the 
mainstream. For instance, Christensen (1997) found that new generations of disk 
drives were not competitive against current generations, so these disk drives found 
their first uses in applications outside the mainstream.  However, if their trajectory of 
improvement is faster than mainstream technologies, eventually disruptive 
technologies catch up with mainstream performance requirements, invade that 
market space, and disrupt conventional technologies. Such dynamics have played 
out with ease in a wide variety of commercial products and services. However, as 
Max Boot (2008) reminds us, the processes for adopting disruptive technologies in 
the military are somewhat different because one does not have as much demand 
variety inside one nation that stimulates these dynamic processes. National 
militaries have a history of resisting and rejecting promising disruptive technologies. 
Instead, disruptive technology dynamics often play out across nations and are seen 
eventually in combat clashes between nations. 
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Thus, defense and commercial markets in many ways represent the ying and 
yang of demand characteristics in innovation systems: they are different, but they 
complement each other.  Defense users often have very high end needs (for good 
reason), whereas commercial users are much more focused on cost.  Defense 
supports long production runs of what are often—at the beginning of production—
highly innovative technologies, whereas the commercial sector holds the ultimate 
promise of larger scale and lower costs, albeit accompanied by a wider variety of 
more rapidly changing demands. Defense fulfills the lead user role par excellence 
and is widely experienced with handling immature innovations, but the structure of 
demand in the commercial sector supports the emergence of disruptive innovations 
more readily than the military sector does.  This complementarity adds strength (as 
well as complexity) to systems of innovation for dual-use technologies and, from a 
policy standpoint, is an opportunity to be leveraged.   
E. Binding Constraints on Industry Growth 
Next, I want to consider what is probably the hardest part of the argument for 
demand-side intervention in the U.S. robotics industry: the notion of focusing on the 
binding constraints on industry innovation. The notion of binding constraints derives 
from economic growth theory—in recent times, via the work of Rodrik (2008)—but 
more broadly draws on the Hirschmanian tradition in growth economics. According 
to Naude (2011), 
By binding constraints I mean constraints on economic growth and 
development which, if relieved, would have a more significant impact on 
promoting growth and development than other constraints. Binding 
constraints, as long as they remain in place, would hinder growth, even if 
other possible constraints or determinants of growth are addressed. 
In operations management, this would be called this a “bottleneck” on 
innovation, and the premise is that by removing a bottleneck, one can have a larger 
impact on the innovation—in this case—within an industry than by applying effort to 
several variables at once or by using a shotgun approach. In turn, the idea of 
attacking binding constraints is based on the further premise that while we can 
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describe the general features of industries using the innovation systems model, 
industries develop in a contingent fashion and therefore differ in their opportunity 
sets and constraints at any given point in their development. The notion of uneven 
development is well established in research on industry growth: Schumpeter (1976), 
for instance, spoke of “discrete rushes” in development; there is also the 
development blocks approach, which similarly highlights a disequilibrium concept of 
industry development. In fact, everything we know about industry development from 
the Schumpeterian tradition of evolutionary economics suggests that systems evolve 
via disequilibriums and that they are best thought of as being in a constant state of 
disequilibrium.  Development is therefore uneven, which means there are 
opportunities to make a larger impact on development of a system if you know 
where to push it at particular points in time; in other words, if you know where the 
bottlenecks are, one can develop strategies to tackle these leverage points. This is 
attractive from a policy perspective because organizations such as the DoD do not 
have unlimited resources, so it makes sense to focus their scarce capacity directly 
on alleviating key bottlenecks on innovation, in the hope of generating the biggest 
bang for their buck (Rodrik, 2008, pp. 56-57). This beats using a wish list of 
desirable strategies to improve an industry’s innovativeness, where many actions on 
this list will not address the most binding constraints and therefore will not have 
much impact on innovation.  
Rodrik (2008, p. 57) suggests that this method of focusing on binding 
constraints can be portrayed as a decision tree (see Figure 5). We start by framing 
the overall problem: “Why is the US robotics innovation system weak?” (CCC, 2009). 
We then trace the probable causes, organized by the theoretical elements we have 
laid out so far, such as the elements of innovation systems highlighted in the Porter 
Diamond and the elements of user venturesomeness highlighted by Bhide.  The idea 
is to uncover the most important bottlenecks that are constraining the innovativeness 
of the system: Is it a case of A or B or C?  As we move down the branches of the 
decision tree, we are discarding candidates for the key bottleneck on industry 
  
 
Acquisition Research Program 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY  - 30 - 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
innovation. Once we identify the candidate imposing the most constraint, then we 
can strategize about how to relax or remove that candidate factor.   
In the case of the U.S .robotics innovation system, my analysis suggests that 
demand-side factors (specifically, lack of discovery of viable, profitable uses for 
robotics, and unknown implementation costs) are the leading bottleneck candidates 
that are weakening the U.S. robotics innovation system or, at minimum, that these 
factors are as strong a candidate as any other factor in the decision tree. Also 
notable is the relative weakness of U.S. firm rivalry in non-defense sectors, perhaps 
owing to the relatively low number of U.S. firms specializing in non-defense robotics 
(relatively low numbers compared to global competitors such as Japan and Europe, 
that is) and potentially because of some defense-sector crowding-out effects (e.g., 
the attractiveness of the U.S. defense sector, with its strong demand and well-
supported R&D, has potentially drawn U.S. resources away from other, non-defense 
robotics businesses).  
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Figure 6. Binding Constraints Decision Tree Analysis  
(Shown in Boxes) 
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III. Demand-Side Support Mechanisms 
Available to the DoD 
A. Summary of Mechanisms 
Based on my binding constraints analysis in Figure 6, in my assessment, 
there are five prime candidates (each indicated with a boxed edge) that may be 
constraining the U.S. robotics industry from flourishing. Four of these candidates are 
clearly on the demand-side, being drivers of weak commercial and industrial (C&I) 
and weak consumer demand for robotics systems.  A fifth—lack of competition from 
disruptive innovators—is an aspect of weak rivalry among U.S. firms in some sectors 
of the robotics industry but also has distinctive demand-side aspects and can be 
influenced by  DoD acquisition strategies, so I will include it in my analysis and 
address here how it might be mitigated.   
In my estimation, the presence of these constraint candidates creates scope 
for policy intervention of some kind on the demand side (in my case, via DoD 
acquisition strategies) in order to alleviate, mitigate, and/or manage these 
constraints, so that improvements can be made in the uptake of unmanned systems 
in the U.S. domestic market. Innovation systems theory suggests that such 
interventions will lead to the long-term strengthening of the U.S. robotics system, 
with benefits for the DoD.     
The four demand-side constraints are as follows: 
1. Lack of well-articulated uses, killer applications: This may be a function 
of producers knowing less about user needs than is desirable and 
users that may not yet be aware of what bleeding-edge robotics are 
capable of.  
 Appropriate strategies for addressing this issue involve the DoD 
demonstrating well-defined user demands that provide 
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2. Too expensive, not currently worth the cost: For many cost-sensitive 
commercial and consumer applications, it may be that current robotics 
offerings are perceived as too expensive to be worth implementing.  
 Appropriate strategies for addressing this issue will address 
cooperative and catalytic acquisition strategies that promise 
enough volume to enable producers to make significant cost 
reductions via economies of scale and learning effects. 
3. Risk of technology immaturity and unknown implementation costs: 
Users may also wonder if robotics technology is mature enough to 
work as promised in their applications and what the implementation 
costs will really look like.  
 Appropriate strategies for addressing this issue will reduce the 
information discovery costs for the private sector by sharing 
information about DoD experiences, where possible.   
4. Unclear legal and regulatory regime governing usage: Unmanned 
systems pose many safety challenges in cluttered people-populated 
environments, a prominent example being the integration of unmanned 
systems into federal air space. 
 Appropriate strategies for addressing this issue will involve the 
DoD participation in accelerating a comprehensive package of 
institutional reforms that will present clear “rules of the game” for 
unmanned systems usage and foster technology standards 
where they are necessary.   
5. Lack of competition from disruptive innovators: A key issue in 
innovation is the incentive structure for the emergence of new, 
disruptive models for unmanned systems. Often, these disruptive 
models are not technology-driven per se but involve a recombination of 
operational practices, financial models, and technological adoption. 
 Appropriate strategies for addressing this issue will include the 
alternative acquisition strategies to traditional major acquisition 
programs for unmanned systems.      
 In the subsequent sections, I address each of the acquisition strategy options 
in more detail.  Throughout, my efforts are guided by the latest research on demand-
side policy tools that have proven efficient and effective in the past for other 
technologies and innovation systems (Edler & Georghiou, 2007). 
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B. Demand Definition: Demonstrating Well-Articulated Uses 
and Killer Applications 
A large part of the opportunity for DoD demand-side strategies can be 
explained by information asymmetries between potential users of robotics systems 
and producers of these systems. For one thing, users often lack information and 
knowledge about what robotics systems are available and what the systems can—or 
could potentially—do for them, that is, the majority of potential robotics users are 
busy carrying out their daily tasks and therefore frequently are not invested in 
understanding what bleeding-edge robotics are capable of. Second, producers often 
lack information and knowledge about what users want, need, and are willing to pay 
for. This is despite the fact that changing user needs for the future are one of the top 
factors in creating opportunity for innovation (BDL, 2003). This is connected to a 
third problem, which is that the costs of resolving these producer-user information 
asymmetries can be very high. Economists refer to these as the transaction costs of 
coordinating the market.  From the producer perspective, demand is scattered; 
producers have to locate users that might have a need for robotics if only they knew 
more about them without the benefit of understanding what the user’s privately 
known needs are or how the user’s own articulation of those needs might unfold 
over time as users learn about the most valuable applications of robotics. Here, the 
innovation system fails because of poor interaction between users and producers, 
which results in producers being unable to read what are very noisy market signals 
(what Geroski [2003] calls the problem of “inchoate” demand), whereas what 
producers really need are user demands defined concretely enough that they can 
reasonably try to meet them. In turn, this results in inefficiencies in R&D 
investments, which are inevitably made on the basis of producer perceptions of 
noisy demand. The result can be a vicious cycle where the transaction costs of user-
producer coordination hold the market in a “bad” equilibrium where both sides of the 
market miss the potentialities of a technology, while a better equilibrium might be 
readily attainable were the information asymmetry issues to be overcome.     
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Experience shows that public sector acquisition policies may sometimes play 
a key role in resolving some of the information asymmetry problems that haunt user-
producer interactions, as described previously (Rothwell, 1984). The key here is 
vicarious learning by private-sector users from the demonstrated uses of robotics by 
others, with UAS usage in the WoT being an excellent example of how this process 
works. Such demonstration effects are well known from innovation diffusion research 
to be a key factor in the uptake of innovations (Rogers, 1995). The two major wars 
have provided an extensive, varied, and tough testing and proving ground for UAS 
usage, enough of which has been observable to the private sector. By providing a 
critical mass of observable UAS usage, the DoD has provided a focal point for 
broader robotics usage and development (Rosenberg, 1976; Metcalfe & Tether, 
2003). The information spillovers, both intentional and unintentional, from these 
programs have considerably raised public awareness of the functionalities and 
potential value of UAS, with “Predator” drones in particular becoming virtually the 
icon of the WoT, thus entering the U.S. public psyche and providing a “taster” of 
robotics potentialities (see, for example, Newsweek, 2008). Strong military demand 
for UAS, with news stories reporting insatiable demand by operational commanders 
for UAS assets and Congress authorizing significant future UAS procurement  
(Gertler, 2012), has added further credibility to claims that this particular kind of 
robotics system has made the leap to becoming a mainstream technology.  UAS has 
many potential applications, from police work to agricultural spraying to real estate 
sales. As suggested by signaling theory, nothing communicates to the private sector 
the potential for UAS usage better than demonstrated applications and concrete 
future orders for the technology by the DoD. These orders often address military-
specific values and goals, such as reducing the risk of military casualties. 
Importantly, the demonstration value of DoD UAS usage does not have to 
encompass specific private-sector needs in order to be of value in informing the 
broader market of UAS viability. There just has to be enough overlap between 
defense and private-sector demands that private-sector observers can benefit from 
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the demonstration effects of military usage, and there is evidence that such overlaps 
often do exist early in the life of major innovations (Geroski, 1990).  
Thus, my overall message is that the demonstration role of DoD usage of 
UAS is instrumental in overcoming information asymmetry problems in the private 
sector. The DoD “show and tell” about UAS has been occurring on a large scale 
over the past 10 years. Other DoD initiatives such as the DARPA Mojave Desert 
robotics Grand Challenge 2005 have also played an important role, in that case 
broadening user awareness to the rapidly accelerating capabilities of terrestrial 
unmanned systems (UMS).  Going forward, from an acquisition and procurement 
strategy perspective, one issue is for the DoD to acknowledge the role that our 
activities have played in the vicarious learning of private-sector robotics users, much 
of which is just now beginning to become evident, and realizing the potential that 
mobilizing private-sector demand may have in catalyzing the evolution of the U.S. 
national robotics innovation system. The DoD should not smother these information 
flows as the WoT winds down in Afghanistan; indeed, they need to replace them in 
order to keep information about robotics flowing into the private sector. This is 
particularly the case for Unmanned Underwater Venhicles (UUVs), where much less 
information is publically available (see Button et al., 2009. I will take up the tension 
between needs for secrecy and public information release in more detail in Section 
3.4 on information sharing). The truth is that despite Bill Gates’ well-known 2006 
article, we are really a long way from a robot in every home. In large part, this is 
because awareness of the potential uses for robotics systems are only now 
beginning to diffuse; in many instances, users are just beginning to figure out how to 
apply robotics.  What private-sector demand exists is still in market niches, and we 
are a long way from a pan-robotics market. I have argued that DoD usage of UAS 
has been one of the major factors in accelerating what pan-robotics awareness there 
is among users.  A lot of perception changes have yet to take place among users, 
but the DoD should not overlook the feedback between these positive perceptions 
and the nation’s interests in building a robust U.S.-based robotics industry. 
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C. Cooperative/Catalytic Acquisition: Addressing High Costs 
of Innovations 
Cooperative/catalytic acquisition involves proceurement by the DoD not only 
to fulfill mission needs but also to stimulate demand in the private sector and/or by 
other federal/state/local actors. The idea is very similar to consortia buying, but in 
this instance, with the DoD acting as the consortia procurement lead. Acquisition can 
be of one of two kinds.  Cooperative acquisition involves the DoD and 
private/state/local/other federal sectors bundling their demand to jointly buy 
innovative robotics offerings.  Catalytic acquisition involves pass-through 
proceurements that are made by the DoD but are ultimately used 100% by others. 
Both types of approaches have been tried in the past, including the U.S. 
Experimental Technology Incentives Program in the 1970s (Rothwell, 1984) and a 
major program that successfully accelerated the diffusion of energy-efficient 
technologies in Sweden in the 1990s (Neji, 1999). 
Cooperative/catalytic acquisition can be effective in accelerating demand and 
the diffusion of innovations for a number of reasons. First, because it bundles and 
consolidates demand that may otherwise be scattered around the market, it helps 
overcome some of the information asymmetry issues I mentioned in Section 3.2 by 
providing a clear, well-articulated demand to producers. Second, the bundling of 
demand creates a critical mass of users and thus has the potential to create 
bandwagon effects, which can be very effective in getting private demand moving 
and in shifting the market into a dynamic state that is receptive to both current and 
future innovations.  Several consequences occur, as follows: 
 Demand bundling via cooperative/catalytic acquisition may enable 
producers and users to invest in economies of scale facilities, thus 
lowering the costs of innovations.  
 Bundling may enable learning-curve effects to be gained, again lowering 
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 Bundling reduces user risks of getting stuck on the wrong technology (see 
Section 2.3) because the technology they chose failed to attract a critical 
mass of other users.  
One notable example of just how effective cooperative acquisition can be 
comes from the emergence of very-low-cost radio frequency identification (RFID) 
tags since 2000 (Dew & Read, 2007). Prior to the Millennium, the RFID market was 
typified by a “chicken-and-egg” problem in which users did not adopt the technology 
in sufficient numbers because it was too expensive, with vendors in turn unable to 
produce RFID tags in the volumes necessary to make it cheaper. A range of 
organizations recognized that this problem might be solvable but none, acting on 
their own, could coordinate the activity of enough players in the system to get a 
collective shift to occur in the marketplace. A consortium of potential RFID users 
formed the Auto ID Center at MIT to overcome these issues by developing a 
wireless bar coding system called the electronic product code (EPC). A key 
consortium member—Walmart—developed an ingenious catalytic acquisition 
strategy by mandating that their top suppliers adopt the EPC on a particular 
timetable. This automatically forced Walmart’s largest suppliers to start procuring 
EPC tags to attach to any shipment designated for Walmart, generating overnight 
demand for hundreds of millions of highly innovative, low-cost RFID tags.  This was 
a manifest “visible hand” coordination of demand for innovation. But what was also 
interesting was the “invisible hand” response, since subsequent to Walmart’s 
mandate, the DoD announced its own mandates to suppliers, on precisely the same 
timetable as Walmart (the top 100 suppliers starting in January 2005, with the rest 
on a planned timetable thereafter), that is, it coordinated procurement on the heels 
of Walmart’s strategy. Other members of the Auto ID Center, such as Metro of 
Germany, and Tesco in the UK, followed with similar mandates.  The result was a 
large-scale, indirect, catalytic acquisition strategy for tags, with Auto ID Center 
members getting their suppliers to make collectively massive procurement of the 
novel EPC tags.   
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Based on this example, one can imagine several other actors with demand-
side profiles for robotics that the DoD could potentially collaborate with for 
cooperative/catalytic acquisition strategies. Within the security domain, the interest 
of many actors in UAS is already becoming evident. Examples of state and local 
police forces already using some UAS have been reported, as have some examples 
of UAS outsourcing by DHS to private security companies (PSCs). It is not hard to 
imagine that the collective demands for UAS of these various 
state/federal/local/private security entities might be bundled in order to give a 
significant demand-side kick-start to the UAS industry to take it well beyond its 
current DoD-focused development by diffusing UAS technology among a much 
wider range of security operators. A second area where cooperative acquisition may 
have potential is utility robotics. The DoD employ some of the most expensive 
military manpower in the world and therefore have strong incentives to invest in 
substitution of mundane but labor-intensive tasks (e.g., cleaning) with utility robots. 
The U.S. private sector and various public-sector entities share these incentives in 
many instances. However, the utility robotics market remains (with the exception of 
iRobot’s vacuum cleaners) woefully underdeveloped and much in need of a 
demand-side kick-start that the DoD might contribute. 
D. Information Sharing: Addressing the Costs and Risks of 
New Technology Implementation 
Despite demonstration effects and cooperative acquisition, prospective UMS 
users still may not know enough about a specific robotics system to make a decision 
about adopting it, owing to lack of information about the costs and risks associated 
with adopting the new system. Prospective adopters know that they will only learn 
what a robotics system really costs to implement, and what its risk profile looks like, 
by actually trying the technology. This is why user venturesomeness is a key part of 
the adoption picture for any new technology. Therefore, the goal of my third 
suggested DoD acquisition strategy is to reduce the discovery costs and risks of 
UMS adoption for other users by information sharing. Prospective adopters can then 
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learn some information from public sources (e.g., the experiences of other users), 
thus leveraging information that is already available within the system of users 
instead of bearing the cost of learning this information privately. As outlined in 
Section 2.3, users face four significant issues as they make adoption choices: How 
well will the technology work? Will there be a critical mass of other users? What is its 
value to me in relation to its price? And, what are the costs of implementing it? A 
pool of common knowledge within an innovation system that addresses these issues 
reduces some of the information deficits plaguing prospective robotics users, thus 
lowering adoption costs and risks and allowing the industry to grow via faster 
adoption than would otherwise be possible. 
One method of creating common knowledge is for the DoD to proactively 
share information about their experiences adopting various UMS with the 
prospective user community. Of course, such sharing has to be done with care in 
order to protect sensitive information and knowledge. What kinds of information can 
be shared varies with the recipient: sharing DoD experiences with DHS is obviously 
different than sharing with local emergency responders (e.g., fire) or private-sector 
users. However, although there is a clear tension with DoD imperatives for secrecy 
with respect to the technical details of some of its UMS programs, the vast majority 
of the information that is useful to other prospective adopters of robotics systems is 
of a much more pedestrian kind, involving key “lessons learned” from DoD 
experiences adopting unmanned systems. A variety of government agencies already 
report some aspects of this information, for example, USAF UAS crash test data 
demonstrating the learning curve compared to manned aircraft; the exact number of 
UAS in operation; aggregate hours flown (Gertler, 2012).  What would make more 
sense is for such sharing to be done deliberately and consistently with an eye to the 
beneficial effects of information spillovers on the adoption of UAS by other users, 
rather than as a by-product of some other goal. Probably the primary method of 
sharing involves one-to-many modes of reporting, for example, sharing information 
at public conferences with AUVSI consortia members and issuing written reports. 
Much of this reporting could take the form of soft, qualitative, lessons learned–type 
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reporting on DoD experiences adopting UMS that does not involve the release of 
any sensitive technical information but is highly informative to other users who are 
trying to make up their minds about the costs and benefits of adopting a specific 
UMS. A second form that information sharing might take involves one-to-one 
interactions and two-way sharing by offering a variety of “open door” arrangements 
for prospective UMS adopters to learn from DoD experiences with robotics.  Here 
again, the point is that the DoD may have lessons learned to trade with DHS, for 
example. But it may also benefit over the long run from carefully informing a much 
wider range of prospective public- and private-sector UMS adopters about its 
experiences. 
Another opportunity to create public knowledge about the costs and risks of 
adopting UMS is via private-sector information spillovers. There is a clear incentive 
for the DoD to encourage information spillovers between other players in the U.S. 
robotics innovation system. Several mechanisms might be used to encourage such 
spillovers. One is producer joint ventures and alliances.  For example, the typical 
DARPA program structure might involve two or three teams—sometimes industry 
teams, sometimes university-industry teams—competing to create the best design. 
Such processes tend to create more opportunities for a rich set of information 
spillovers, including to users, especially when the program is of a more downstream 
“development” nature, as many recent DARPA programs have been. 
Lastly, the DoD might also consider engaging in some joint adoption projects 
with other users.  Some examples of partnering already exist, for example,  the NPS 
partners with MBARI (Monterey Bay Acquarium Research Institute) on marine 
robotics. However, these relationships are more research oriented and less adoption 
driven. While research relationships are to be encouraged, so are implementation-
driven projects, where the goal is learning and discovering the costs and risks of 
implementing a major robotics initiative so that these costs and risks can be reduced 
in future implementations. One key to these processes is that they activate 
interactions between the DoD, other users, producers, and others in the robotics 
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innovation system, with the end goal being the discovery and distribution of new 
information relating to operational usage of a particular UMS. The most appropriate 
focus for such partnering on projects is obviously applications that are not of a 
sensitive nature, for example, back office apps such as supply chain efficiency 
initiatives, or crisis response within the U.S.  For example, opportunities exist to 
partner with other federal agencies (e.g., DHS), state and local authorities (e.g., 
emergency responders), and private-sector players (e.g., PSCs) on the application 
of robotics systems in domestic crisis situations. Another example of a back office 
application is warehouse robotics where the DoD might partner with its major 
contractors such as Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) (see Kiva, 2012, for examples of 
some remarkable efficiency gains being achieved in the online retailing business). 
Other examples might be medical robotics, where the DoD has leading-edge needs, 
and security robots, for example, augmenting perimeter security of CONUS bases, 
which have many commonalties with perimeter security needs among other public-
sector agencies as well as in the private sector.  Here again, the goals for robotics 
usage are mainly about developing usage models that are better and more efficient 
than current alternatives (cost saving via labor substitution) and do not involve the 
sharing of proprietary and sensitive technical information, per se. 
E. Regulation: Helping Establish “Rules of the Game” for 
Public Robotics Usage 
The question of what the rules of the game will look like for robotics usage in 
public spaces remains a key issue in the industry. Uncertainty about the regulatory 
regime governing robotics usage clearly holds back users from making investments 
in adoption.  This is because of the risk that the way they plan to use robotics could 
be unfavorably impacted by future regulations. Regulatory uncertainty  also holds 
back producers from investing in designing new robotics systems until the regulatory 
regime is clear, so they know what constraints their design has to successfully meet. 
In contrast, a well-defined set of regulations around usage helps users define and 
articulate economical ways to use robotics and helps producers to design with 
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confidence, both of which promotes adoption.  Because robotics is a fast-evolving 
technology, a key issue is to establish a regulatory regime governing usage that is 
flexible enough to leave scope for users and producers to take advantage of future 
advances in the state of the art.  
Among many economists, sociologists, and political scientists, there is 
widespread agreement on the importance of regulation of various kinds, which is 
usually studied under the label of institutions. For example, many argue that the 
institutional setup in a country is one of the leading factors affecting its long-run 
development, if not the leading factor (Rodrik, 2008). Part of the reason for this is 
that good institutions are a key factor that allows countries to invest in new 
technologies. Some of these institutions are formal rules of the game in the sense 
that they are legally enforced by the state. Other institutions are of a softer, informal 
nature and represent socially acceptable norms for ways of doing things. Together, 
these formal and informal sets of rules define how technologies can be used by 
constraining their operation to particular allowable circumstances, thus defining the 
incentive structure for adoption. For instance, autonomous automobiles are currently 
regulated off public highways in every country in the world, but specific usage (under 
400 feet) of public airspace by commercial UAS users is beginning to be allowed in 
the U.S. by the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) (Lacher & Maroney, 2012). In 
addition the Nevada state legislature has signaled the beginnings of the integration 
of UMS on the roads by asking its Department of Motor Vehicles to draft regulations 
for autonomous vehicle usage (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2012). The 
aforementioned demonstration effect of UAS, specifically Predator drones, in combat 
operations has informally “normed” the U.S. public to UAS usage, in contrast to 
autonomous autos where social acceptance still appears lower. All other things 
being equal, the fact that the formal and informal institutional playing field favors 
UAS over autonomous autos is expected to have a significant impact on the uptake 
of these respective innovations in the marketplace, until the law and norms change.  
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A key question is where DoD acquisition strategy plays in regulatory issues. 
Two factors stand out. First, the DoD is a vital part of the overall emerging policy mix 
governing robotics usage, in large part owing to its role as a lead user in robotics. 
Because it has been at the bleeding edge of much robotics adoption, the DoD has 
had to develop its own internal (formal) regulations and (informal) policies on UMS 
operations via learning by doing and experience with operating these systems. 
These regulations and policies are gradually embodied in the specific UMS 
technologies that the DoD acquires from industry and over time become part and 
parcel of the specifications demanded by the DoD.  Because their own regulations 
and policies are prototypes that may be adopted by other private/state/federal/local-
sector UMS users, the DoD have some influence over the regulations adopted in the 
wider market.  In short, MILSPECS (United States defense standard) of various 
kinds have accompanied the diffusion of technologies in the past, and we might 
anticipate that this could also be the case to some extent in robotics. A case in point 
is the evolution of informal norms around acceptable UMS usage. One critical area 
in this regard is UMS autonomy, which is a regulatory frontier where DoD 
experiences may have considerable value. For example, the development of 
decision rules in combat UMS that involve life and death choices may spill over to 
other domains, such as autonomous autos’ need to prevent road traffic accidents or 
to choose which accident to have when no safe choice is available. Here again, 
robotics technology and the social rule set will evolve together and the DoD’s early 
user experiences with these issues make it likely that they will play a role in shaping 
the norms for safe behavior among robots that are later applied to other use 
domains. Therefore, the choices that the DoD makes in its acquisitions of robotics 
are likely to have spillover effects on the evolution of formal and informal regulation 
in the rest of the robotics space.  
A second place that  DoD acquisition  strategy plays in regulatory issues is 
that the DoD are significant stakeholders in regulations promoted by other federal 
agencies, for example, the FAA.  This raises interagency coordination issues, and 
with an important seat at this table, the DoD has the opportunity to accelerate or 
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retard the FAA’s progress on regulations. Currently, the FAA issues permits for UAS 
usage, with about 300 operator permits issued so far (each permit may permit 
multiple UAS to be flown) that allow the holders to fly in specific geographic areas 
outside airspace designated for commercial, business, and private planes. From the 
perspective of encouraging adoption of and promoting the U.S. robotics innovation 
system, it makes sense for the DoD to do whatever it  can to see the new FAA 
regulations instituted in a timely fashion. Also, because the DoD has a hand in which 
regulations get adopted, they also have some influence over the incentive structure 
that FAA regulations create. An example is the FAA’s NextGen (Next Generation Air 
Transportation System), which uses GPS technology and promises to allow 
numerous cost savings for aircraft operators, such as more efficient routing, less 
delays, and more economical landing approaches. Specific regulations on UMS 
usage, which are currently being negotiated for 2014, will likewise constrain and 
enable the efficiency of UAS; therefore, the DoD has a hand in negotiating how 
attractive the use environment will be for other UAS adopters. Moreover, these 
regulations are likely to affect regulation in other UMS domains, that is, terrestrial 
and marine environments, because what works well in the air domain will likely get 
carried over to other domains where the DoD operates. Once again, wherever DoD 
policy affects terrestrial and marine UMS regulation, it generally makes sense for the 
DoD to adopt policies that accelerate the institutions necessary for usage to become 
widespread, in order to support the U.S. as a lead market in robotics adoption.  
F. Unorthodox Acquisition Strategies: Addressing a Lack of 
Disruptive Competition 
Although not designed to directly address private-sector competition issues, I 
have suggested already that military acquisition strategies clearly enter the broader 
policy mix for innovation systems (see Section 1.4).  This occurs largely through 
acquisition choices, rather than R&D subsidies.  For example, Geroski (1990) 
concluded that second-sourcing policies by the DoD have had the effect of 
encouraging competition and stimulating the rapid diffusion of innovations in U.S. 
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markets, much more so than in the UK, where second sourcing is rare by the UK 
Ministry of Defence (MoD). The DoD’s policy of acquiring via the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) program has also had competitive effects on the 
diffusion of innovations by encouraging the entry of small, entrepreneurial firms with 
new ideas into the defense industrial base. Therefore, I think it is reasonable to 
suppose that the DoD’s acquisition strategies already do have important indirect 
effects on the competitive structure of some industries.  
As I have shown, a key factor in developing robust innovation systems is 
competition among producers (see Section 2.1).  Broadly speaking, the economic 
incentive structure for competition can be framed as encompassing two kinds of 
incentives: neoclassical and Schumpeterian. By neoclassical, I mean addressing 
issues such as the contestability of markets by keeping barriers to entry low. This 
enables more firms to enter the marketplace. The resulting competition pushes down 
costs via competitive learning and investment, encourages entrepreneurial effort to 
discover how to apply a technology to new market segments, and incents marketing 
and promotion efforts to encourage technology diffusion, all of which build demand 
for a market. These actions may be critical in enabling some national innovation 
systems to flourish, because price advantages via lower costs are often at the heart 
of global lead market advantages (Beise, 2004). The Schumpeterian approach to 
competitive incentives is different but no less important. It involves seeing innovation 
as the prime competitive weapon and thus aims at incenting innovative effort—in 
particular, disruptive innovation (see Section 2.4). Here, the incentive system is the 
threat of disruption, which provides a strong mechanism for encouraging existing 
players with more conventional technology to invest in staying competitive, under 
threat of being disrupted by emerging technologies, usually with initially lower-end 
performance. Thriving innovation systems are built out of technologies at different 
stages of development, with emerging technologies constantly putting pressure on 
more established offerings in the marketplace by threatening to take market share 
from them. This is the heart of the Schumpeterian model of innovation.  
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This leads me to conclude that the DoD has an incentive to encourage—
where possible—the emergence of disruptive technologies in the U.S. robotics 
innovation system, because these currently nascent technologies of today may be 
the alternatives on which the DoD will be drawing tomorrow. The point here is to use 
acquisition strategy adroitly in order to build real options for COTS technologies that 
might be spun in to the DoD at some point in the future. These spin-ins provide 
improved technology options for the future. Indirectly, the emergence of disruptive 
COTS technology also incents competition among the DoD’s current robotics 
supplier base. 
While several unorthodox acquisition mechanisms can be employed to 
achieve these goals, one example of a creative approach has been the use of 
leasing arrangements by the USN for UAS assets, specifically leasing the Insitu 
ScanEagle (“ScanEagle”) system. This approach is very instructive for a number of 
reasons. For one, the ScanEagle was originally designed and developed as a tool 
for the fishing industry in order to make the detection of fish in the open sea more 
efficient. It is therefore an example of COTS technology spun in to the DoD 
(primarily the Marines), although it has also been used by other DoD services, 
internationally, and in commercial industry.  Next, the USN’s contract with 
ScanEagle involves an operating lease in which the USN, in effect, buys delivered 
pixels from ScanEagle. Thus the USN uses a dual-track procurement approach 
whereby it buys service from Insitu on a company-owned, company-operated 
(COCO) contract, at the same time that it chooses government-owned, government-
operated (GOGO) arrangements elsewhere.  The COCO contract has proved 
important in ScanEagle’s case, owing to the disruptive nature of the technology. 
According to company representatives, ScanEagle was conceived from the get-go 
as a disruptive design that would be cheap and start with relatively low performance 
but would leverage the progressive improvements in electronics allowed by Moore’s 
Law to rapidly improve over time. The firm has now logged over 80 major design 
improvements in five years (>1 per month), which are 100% self funded.  
Importantly, this striking rate of performance improvement is only possible because 
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of the COCO contract, which keeps ScanEagle outside the DoD program 
management system where, according to company representatives, the DoD’s 
system would have inevitably slowed down ScanEagle’s improvement rate. 
I hazard several conclusions from this example. First, the COCO leasing 
arrangement is a perfect example of using a dual-track approach in which an 
unorthodox acquisition strategy is used at the margin, while conventional 
approaches (GOGO) are maintained for the vast majority of DoD acquisitions. 
Second, this unorthodox leasing arrangement for the ScanEagle works precisely 
because it produces orthodox competitive incentives, namely, giving the supplier an 
incentive to continuously innovate in order to save costs (which they benefit from) 
and increase volumes (by offering their customers a better product for the same 
leasing price). Third, the leasing approach is an excellent example of the DoD 
engaging selectively with COTS innovations that fulfill mission requirements but at 
the same time fuel competition in the COTS market by providing competitive 
incentives for the rapid improvement of a disruptive technology.  
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IV. Implementation Framework 
A. Implementing a Change in Mindset in the DoD 
In this final section of the report, I focus on issues regarding the 
implementation of the policy tools so far outlined by recognizing the unique DoD 
environment in which implementation has to take place. As is well-known in research 
on the strategic management of organizations, and from organization theory, the 
implementation of new directions for an organization creates significant challenges. 
In short, policies that look like good ideas on paper often fail at the implementation 
stage because of the barriers to putting them in place in practice (for a prior study of 
these issues in the USN, see Dew, 2010). Therefore, in this section of the report, I 
consider some key factors effecting the implementation of the demand-side 
strategies for DoD robotics that I have identified. 
There are two broad categories of issues regarding implementation that we 
will consider: the first involves sensitizing acquisition professionals within the DoD to 
the role that their decisions about acquisition might have in innovation outcomes; the 
second involves enabling the coordination of efforts across different organizational 
elements within the DoD (Edler & Georghiou, 2007). 
The first element of sensitizing acquisition professionals involves creating an 
enhanced mindset that the DoD’s acquisition choices can make an important 
difference in the evolution of the U.S. robotics innovation system. Here, the need for 
some changes in the practices of acquisition professionals rests on changes in 
informal factors, such as the basic mindset or cognitive assumptions made in the 
domain. A prominent issue is the aforementioned assumption that supporting 
innovation classically occurs via intervention on the supply-side, that is, that R&D 
support is the major route to increased robotics innovation.  I described this earlier 
as technofetishism (see Section 1.3). Changing the deeply held assumption favoring 
technology creation will be challenging owing to various factors that lead to cognitive 
inertia in organizations and therefore requires quite significant education and 
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leadership of cultural change among acquisition professionals . Such needs occur in 
the context of calls already made for the significant upgrading of human capital in 
the acquisition workforce (Gansler, 2007). However, human capital upgrading also 
represents a natural opportunity to incorporate the demand-side perspective into the 
future education requirements for acquisition professionals. A movement within 
management research known as evidence-based management (EBM) may also be 
important here. EBM is designed to re-focus education on what really matters 
(based on empirical evidence) in a domain, rather than what has been traditionally 
thought to matter. And the facts about demand-side impacts on innovation speak for 
themselves, as seen in the following examples:  
• A major survey by BDL (2003) found that 50% of innovations 
implemented by firms were driven by new user demands and only 12% 
by new technological developments. 
• A survey of all innovations commercialized in Finland from 1984 to 
1998 found that 48% of innovations were driven by public policy or 
procurement.  
• A well-known study of innovation commercialization in the 1970s 
(Rothwell, 1984) concluded that over the long term, public acquisition 
triggered more innovation than R&D subsidies did. 
• Detailed research on the evolution of individual industries further 
substantiates broader claims about the role of demand in industry 
evolution. In the case of the RFID industry in prior work, I found that 
demand-side factors were the leading cause of industry development 
from the late 1990s onwards, including alliances between the DoD and 
Walmart (Dew & Read, 2007). 
• In a review article, Geroski (1990) was led to the conclusion that 
acquisition policy is a far more refined instrument for generating 
innovation than R&D subsidies, despite the latter’s more frequent use.  
Overall, then, these results support the implementation of training and 
education and culture change within the DoD that sensitizes acquisition 
professionals to the importance of their robotics-related acquisition strategies for 
innovation in the robotics space, as well as beyond.   
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A second issue involves enabling efforts to be coordinated across different 
DoD organizational elements. A formal organizational response is needed that builds 
on changes in the informal organizational mindset, highlighted previously.  The core 
issue  is that in a complex, highly differentiated organization such as the DoD, 
various organization elements (including some outside the DoD, e.g., in Congress) 
share some responsibility for how the acquisition budget gets spent and that 
together, these elements collectively provide a policy mix for innovation (Flanagan et 
al., 2011). In order to coordinate these elements, first and foremost what is needed 
is official policy regarding the explicit incorporation of innovation goals into 
acquisitions that involve robotics, which is rapidly becoming many of the major 
acquisition programs as well as many other general procurement  contracts. To use 
the example again of warehouse robotics, acquisition  strategy can be used to incent 
our logistics contractors to accelerate the adoption of robotics systems into DoD 
support operations. Or, to incorporate driverless vehicles into convoys, more rapidly, 
etc. To achieve the kind of cross-departmental coordination that is needed to result 
in consistent policy across many different acquisition domains inevitably means that 
goals for innovation will have to be pushed down from a sufficiently high level in DoD 
organizations. Only with transparent goals and continuous high-level signals of 
support for these goals will the various commands with a hand in acquisition choices 
“get on board” and actually implement the various policy tools for promoting robotics 
innovation that I have talked about. 
B. Implementing a Multidimensional Evaluation Process 
Innovation policy at the level of national economies often encompasses broad 
and undefined objectives, although the general purpose is increased 
competitiveness. However, for the DoD there is a need to be more explicit about the 
contributions of demand-side strategies toward military efficiency and effectiveness, 
that is, toward the DoD’s explicit security goals. This means that the evaluation of 
the impacts of strategies is key (Edler et al., 2012). Since innovation evaluation to 
date has focused on supply-side metrics, in this section, I will briefly spell out a 
framework for measuring innovation impacts on the demand side. 
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My prior work on evaluation metrics for DARPA (Dew, 2011) led me to 
undertake a comprehensive study of research on the evaluation of technology 
transition, much of which is relevant for the present study. A key takeaway from this 
research was that a multidimensional approach to evaluation is necessary for any 
kind of technology diffusion, owing to the multiplicity of the impacts and outcomes, 
and different assessment according to who does the assessing: 
Success means different things to different people. An architect may consider 
success in terms of aesthetic appearance, an engineer in terms of technical 
competence, an accountant in terms of dollars spent under budget, a human 
resources manager in terms of employee satisfaction. Chief executive officers 
rate their success in the stock market. (Freeman & Beale, 1992, p. 8; 
Shenhar, Dvir, Levy, & Maltz, 2001)  
 In short, “one size does not fit all” in the world of evaluation.  What is critical 
is embracing the need for multiple dimensions of measurement in order to avoid 
getting caught in some specific “mis-measurement” trap. This has led to the 
introduction of multidimensional frameworks for the assessment of success, one of 
the most useful of which can be adapted from Shenhar et al. (2001), summarized in 
Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Multidimensional Framework for Evaluating Success of  
Demand-Side Acquisition Policies 
The idea illuminated by Figure 7 is that different dimensions of success are 
important across different time spans. In the short term, the emphasis is on whether 
specific goals were met (on budget, on time, on spec). Beyond this, the question of 
market development is key, that is, did the demand-side policies implemented lead 
to the objectives highlighted in Section 1.4: to help the U.S. maintain/become the 
world leader in air, marine, and utility robotics by accelerating the diffusion of these 
technologies in the U.S. market?  However, if these objectives are met, then they 
should lead to further measurable results, including many organizational success 
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stories and new organizational foundings within the U.S. robotics innovation system.  
Finally, one might gauge success in terms of the overall performance of the U.S. 
robotics innovation system over the long run, measured in terms of its capacity and 
capabilities. Following, I develop each of these areas on measurement in more 
detail:  
1. Efficiency measures focus on whether the initiative met its targets by 
being on budget, on time, and on spec goals, that is, the initiative met 
the constraints that were initially specified for it. These are the 
traditional measures of project success that can be naturally applied to 
any acquisition strategy or intervention that is used. For example, 
cooperative/catalytic acquisition initiatives can be evaluated on such a 
basis, as can impact assessments of legal regime evolution and usage 
standards.    
2. The impact on users of unmanned systems is a key measure of 
success for strategic initiatives aimed at diffusing robotics in the U.S., 
for the long-term benefit of the DoD. Market development indicators 
are important metrics here because they indicate that other users are 
buying and adopting the technology and therefore are a key indication 
that demand-side influence is working. Other specific metrics that are 
useful are measures of changes in procurement behavior of users. 
Measuring the development of competencies of users is also useful 
since highly competent robotics users are more demanding of 
suppliers, thus enhancing the robotics innovation system. 
3. Organization success is a third measure for evaluating the impact of 
DoD demand-side strategies.  The relevant metrics are those that 
capture the success of organizations comprising the U.S. robotics 
innovation system, which might encompass their global market share, 
profitability, and growth. The presence and impact of disruptive 
innovators in the U.S. robotics innovation system are other metrics 
worth tracking. 
4. Lastly, my evaluation framework highlights that success is also a 
function of how prepared you are for the future.  The idea is to capture 
metrics that indicate how much the capacity and capability of the U.S. 
robotics innovation system as a whole has been enhanced. Measures 
such as patenting activity, number and innovativeness of new designs 
under development, number of engineers, and network relations with 
organizations globally might all be useful indications of such capacity 
and capability enhancements. 
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